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SECRET SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 002455

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM TH

SUBJECT: THAILAND: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES RECONCILIATION WITH
ADVISER TO BOTH PM AND CROWN PRINCE; VIKTOR BOUT RAISED

REF: A. BANGKOK 2405 (THAILAND, S MARCHING SEASON)

I.B. BANGKOK 2260 (QUASHING THAKSIN PARDON SUGGESTIONS

IC. BANGKOK 2125 (POLICE CHIEF BATTLE)

ID. BANGKOK 567 (AMBASSADOR PRESSES DEPUTY PM SUTHEP
ON VIKTOR BOUT EXTRADITION)

IE. BANGKOK 385 (ENGAGING PM ON BOUT)

BANGKOK 00002455 001.2 OF 004

Classified By: CDA James F. Entwistle, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) .
SUMMARY AND COMMENT

11. (C) Summary: Ambassador met with Niphon Promphan,
Secretary-General for Prime Minister Abhisit and a trusted
advisor of Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn, on September 24.
Niphon expressed exasperation with the prolonged political
stalemate and what he characterized as a degradation of Thai
political culture. He nevertheless hoped for a solution to
the impasse, based on amending the constitution, ensuring
some accountability for gross violations of the law by both
yellow-shirts and red-shirts, and a reconciliation/amnesty
deal which would have to include Thaksin. Niphon believed
the latter would need to include the return of some of
Thaksin's frozen assets and Thaksin serving a nominal period,
as short as "a few days," in jail. A deal with Thaksin was
complicated because no one trusted Thaksin; Thaksin had
further complicated matters with his incendiary rhetoric and
by allowing his proxies to repeatedly impugn Privy Council
Chair GEN Prem Tinsulanonda ' s character in the recent
September 19 rally. Niphon said that although he was one of
only several Democrats still on good terms with Thaksin and
that Thaksin wanted to talk with him, Niphon 's current
positions with the PM and the Crown Prince made such a direct
conversation impracticable.

1L2 . (C) On royal succession, Niphon asserted that when the
time came, the Crown Prince would succeed his father,
successfully reburnish his image in the mold of the King, and
secure the monarchy's future in Thailand. The tricky part
would come "in the transition phase." He argued that the

Prince had learned from his father's example and would be
well-positioned to do the job; Niphon did not offer an
explanation why the Crown Prince did not start emulating the
King and Princess Sirindhorn's good works activities
immediately, only that he could do so. According to Niphon,
the Prince enjoyed good relations with Sirindhorn and did not
feel threatened by her popularity. Niphon offered indirect
indications of discomfort about the Crown Prince ' s meddling
in the Police Chief saga, but suggested the affair would end
shortly after PM Abhisit's return from the U.S. Niphon also
expressed his profound disappointment with the lower court's
decision in the Viktor Bout case (see paras 16-17).

1L3 . (C) Comment: Niphon is the only Democrat we know of who
advocates cutting a deal with Thaksin, but given his dual
positions as PM Abhisit's defacto Chief of Staff and the
Crown Prince's chief adviser, his views cannot be discounted.

The devil, of course, is in the details, and even Niphon was
hard pressed to outline a viable path forward to
reconciliation. As it stands, we believe there are two
primary obstacles. The first challenge lies in getting all
the parties to the table. No deal seems possible without the
following actors breaking bread together at the same time:
Thakin ' s cronies in the United Front for Democracy against
Dictatorship (UDD), aka "the red-shirts," as well as the
formal opposition Puea Thai Party; PM Abhisit's
representatives and the Democrats; the People's Alliance for
Democracy (PAD), aka "the yellow-shirts;" and representatives
from the Privy Council. As reported in reftels, the Privy
Council would appear to be the most problematic piece of this
particular puzzle, as we see no current appetite for talks.
Secondly, any hypothetical deal would need to address
Thakin ' s fugitive legal status and his confiscated assets.

BANGKOK 00002455 002.2 OF 004

Given the tense atmospherics right now, it is hard for us to
envision either side compromising on the question of jail
time for Thaksin, something Niphon freely acknowledged. End
Summary and Comment .

INCREASING POLITICAL RANCOR MAKES DIALOGUE DIFFICULT

1L4 . (C) The Ambassador hosted PM Office Secretary General,

Democrat Party deputy Secretary General, and chief adviser to
the Crown Prince Niphon Promphan at the residence September
24 and asked him about the political impasse that has beset
Thailand since the 2006 coup. Niphon expressed dismay with
the tenor of the current political dialogue, remarking that
it was as partisan and rancorous as he had ever seen it, a
function he believed of the selfishness of politicians. When
the Ambassador asked whether this phenomenon helped
precipitate Thaksin's rise to power in 2001, Niphon argued
that Thaksin had simply identified voter interests — using a
professional polling outfit — and then tailored a domestic
agenda accordingly.

1[5 . (C) When the Ambassador asked whether Niphon retained any

kind of rapport with Thaksin, Niphon replied that while they
remained on good terms — he was one of only one or two
Democrats in that category — they no longer talked.

According to Niphon, Thaksin's intermediaries had made it
clear that Thaksin would like to talk with him, but Niphon 's
current position in the government and especially his
proximity to the Crown Prince meant that such a talk would be
considered scandalous in the current political context.

1[6 . (C) Turning to Thailand's formal political divide, Niphon

expressed his personal commitment to crafting a solution
through dialogue, mentioning his own engagement with former
Thaksin lieutenant, banned Thai Rak Thai executive and
ex- Justice Minister Pongthep Thepkanchana . From Puea Thai
(PT), Thaksin's younger sister Yingluck Shinawatra was now
Thaksin's conduit to PT MPs, even if she lacked a formal
position in the party. Niphon stressed the need to expand the
dialogue to include representatives from many sides,

including yellow-shirts and the Privy Council. When asked by
Ambassador to suggest who from the Privy Council would be
willing to participate, Niphon initially struggled to
identify any one, finally suggesting Air Vice Marshal Kamthon
Sindvananda and Mr. Sawad Wattanayagorn . He also added Arsa
Sarasin, the Principal Private Secretary.

J.7 . (C) Niphon suggested at least three issues needed to be

addressed: amending the constitution; basic accountability
for gross legal infractions, and some package deal on
amnesty/Thaksin . The Constitution amendment process had
picked up steam, though a national referendum would be
required. Both yellow and red would also have to accept
culpability for breaking the law — the yellow takeover of
the airports in November-December 2008, the red violence in
April, in which Niphon narrowly escaped. While there was
some willingness for an amnesty of sorts, the main challenge
was how to apply it to Thaksin. Public out of hand
rejections aside, Niphon believed that this question could be
addressed in private negotiations; there were three key
issues: Thaksin' money; his acceptance of legal guilt; and
his future role.

1[8 . (C) On the issue of returning Thaksin's frozen assets,

Niphon suggested one compromise would be a stiff capital
gains tax on the gains made while Thaksin was PM, returning
the balance to Thaksin. Niphon noted that Abhisit, not in
power at the time of the judicial decision, had remarked that
it was unfair for Thaksin to lose the assets he had when he
entered office in 2001. The more difficult part involved
Thaksin's legal standing; Niphon initially suggested a
symbolic four days in jail before suspension/pardon might do

BANGKOK 00002455 003.2 OF 004

the trick, before concluding Thaksin would likely refuse to
spend even one day in jail.

1[9 . (C) An additional complication, according to Niphon, would
be a requirement that Thaksin stay out of politics. No one
really trusted Thaksin, particularly the younger generation
of Democrat MPs. Any deals with him would be viewed with
great skepticism, particularly any promises to stay out of
the political arena. Invoking the ghost of Neville
Chamberlain and the Munich agreement with Hitler, Niphon
concluded everyone was wary of making a peace with Thaksin
that he likely would fail to respect.

1L10. (C) According to Niphon, one of Thaksin's biggest
problems was the fact that he lacked a close adviser with
good judgment. Thaksin wasn't receiving sound counsel and
therefore too often made the wrong decision. He tended to,
in other words, select the wrong tools from the proverbial
tool kit; Niphon cited Thaksin's unleashing his proxies
against General Prem during the September 19 red-shirt rally
(REF A) as the perfect illustration. The profane attacks on
General Prem's character made the Privy Council less inclined
to consider reconciliation talks, Niphon stated.

POLICE CHIEE IMBROGLIO

1[11. (C) On the subject of the ongoing saga to name a new
Police Chief (REF C), Niphon suggested that the issue would
conclude within ten days of PM Abhisit 's return from the
United States, by the end of the first week of October. When
the Ambassador asked how the issue would be resolved, noting
first that it was widely known that Crown Prince
Va j iralongkorn was pushing for Police General Jumpol Manmai
over PM Abhisit 's choice of Police General Prateep Tunprasert
(note: who also allegedly has the Queen's backing. End
note), Niphon shifted uncomfortably and initially replied
merely that he knew who "his choice" was (note: Jumpol).

When the Ambassador asked whether a third choice compromise
candidate might be the solution, Niphon agreed that it might
be a possibility, though he repeated that "his choice" was
the correct choice, adding that he believed the matter should

have concluded long ago.

J.12 . (C) When the Ambassador inquired whether the Crown

Prince's direct intervention in the Police Chief selection
process had implications for public perceptions of the role
of the monarchy in governance, Niphon suggested that it did.
Niphon acknowledged that the perceived intervention was
unhelpful both for the Crown Prince and the monarchy.

CROWN PRINCE — READY FOR PRIME TIME?

J.13. (C) Turning to the Crown Prince and the monarchy's role

in Thailand in general, Niphon argued that Thailand was in
many ways at a crossroads. Niphon estimated that a majority
of Thai — including nearly all of those over the age of 40
-- still strongly supported the monarchy. According to
Niphon, Thai in the 18-40 age demographic in contrast were
far more focused on their every day lives and economic well
being, without a set view of the monarchy. This group could
be swayed either way, though on balance he felt they would
ultimately be more inclined to support the monarchy if
engaged with a positive message.

1[14. (C) According to Niphon, the Crown Prince was well aware
that he would inherit the throne at a critical moment in the
monarchy's future, and Niphon believed the Crown Prince was
ready to rise to the occasion (note: Niphon and
Va j iralongkorn were boarding school classmates in England, at
Millfield, from 1966-70. End Note). The Crown Prince
understood the challenges — particularly the challenges

BANGKOK 00002455 004.2 OF 004

associated with following his father — but he was confident
nevertheless. Sharp and perceptive, the Crown Prince had
been learning and absorbing lessons from his father since he
was a child, claimed Niphon. The Crown Prince also had a
great memory; Niphon cited a schoolboy exchange in which the
Crown Prince described how, when he was three, he would take
note when he overheard members of the Royal Court saying
disparaging things about the King or Queen, file the
conversations away, and then report them to his parents later
that night.

1[15. (C) When the Ambassador noted that in some ways the Crown

Prince was overshadowed by Princess Sirindhorn's popularity
and charisma, Niphon remarked that this dynamic had not in
any way negatively affected their close relationship. The
Crown Prince was aware of what he needed to do in order to be
a successful monarch, and he would change his personality and
character overnight in order to fit the demands of the job,
Niphon claimed. Such a transformation was not without
precedent; Niphon cited General Prem's transition from
general to PM. Prior to assuming the PM job, Prem had
disliked businessmen to the point that he refused to allow
them on his property. After he became PM, however, he
started working very closely with the business community and
would even fly around the world on road shows with
businessmen to help drum up opportunities for them.

VIKTOR BOUT

1[16. (S) Niphon concluded the meeting by expressing his

profound personal disappointment with the lower court verdict
in the Viktor Bout extradition hearing, a feeling he
suggested extended throughout the government, including the
Prime Minister's office. Niphon said he hoped the issue
would correct itself during the appeals process, and he
reiterated that the Prime Minister was closely following it.
(Note: When allegations that Bout's supporters were
attempting to seek favor with associates of the Crown Prince
emerged in early 2009, the Ambassador had engaged Niphon to
shut the door on that possibility. See refs D and E. End
Note . )

^17. (C) The Ambassador thanked Niphon and noted that the RTG

had been helpful at every step of the way, from the March
2008 arrest through preparation of the recent appeal.
Policymakers in Washington understood the distinction between
the RTG ' s close cooperation on the case and the lower court's
decision. The latter was an outlier that did not in any way
reflect the RTG's spirit of overall partnership.

Nevertheless, overturning the lower court's decision on
appeal would be absolutely critical both on the merits of the
case and to avoid any negative impact on the overall
U.S.-Thai relationship.

ENTWISTLE